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Abstract. A methodology for analyzing and assessing the effectiveness of
command, control and communications (C3) systems is developed. The analysis
is carried out by characterizing separately both the system and the mission
in terms of attributes. These attributes are determined as functions of
primitives that describe the system, the mission, and the context within
which both operate. Then the system capabilities and the mission require-
ments are compared in a common attribute space. This comparison leads to
the evaluation of partial measures of effectiveness which are then combined
to yield a global measure. The methodology is illustrated through the as-
sessment of the effectiveness of a communications network operating in a
hostile environment.
INTRODUCTION
In analyzing the effectiveness of a C3 system,
it is essential that the diversity of usersSystem effectiveness is an elusive concept
and types of services demanded be taken intothat encompasses technical, economic, and
behavioral considerations. When the system account. Also, the tolerances associated
with each system characteristic or attributeto be evaluated is one which provides a ser- with each system characteristic or attribute
must be established so that the adequacy
vice, such as a command, control and commu-
nications (C3) system, then the needs of the of the service provided by a given system
organization that uses it must be taken into realization can be evaluated.
account. Furthermore, the worth of the ser-
The basic premise of the methodology is that
vice it provides may change in value as mis- 3
a C system provides a variety of services
sions change, as technologies change and as (or supports a variety of functions). The(or supports a variety of functions). Thethe opponent's capabilities change. Thus, any
methodology that is proposed for C3 system ef- complementaryemise is that each user
imposes on a CI system a load which is gener-fectiveness analysis must be sufficiently broad imposes on a C system a load which is gener-
and flexible so that it can accommodate change ated from a need for service that th  system
and can evolve over time. may or may not be able to satisfy. Thus, on
one side, there is the C system with a range
Such a methodology is proposed in this paper. of capabilities for providing service, while
The analytical aspects of the methodology ad- on the other is the military organization
dress mainly the relationships between compo- with its diverse needs for service. There-
nent characteristics, system structure, and fore, the first step of the methodology is
operating procedures to system availability based on the ability to model the system's
and performance. Availability is defined as capabilities and the organization's require-
a probabilistic quantity dependent on the ments in terms of commensurate attributes.
random failure characteristics of system com- This and the other steps in the methodology
ponents (whether or not due to enemy action). are described in the next section. In the
System performance denotes the ability to third section, an illustrative example is
achieve appropriate operational goals for a presented.
given availability state [Fink, 1980]. It
is assumed that the cost associated with any SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS
system realization and operation can be com-
puted: the total cost may reflect the costs The methodology outlined in this section is
for developing and implementing the system based on six concepts: system, mission,
and the costs for operating and maintaining context, primitives, attributes, and mea-
it. Finally, the assessment of worth is left sures of effectiveness. The first three
for the final, and subjective stage of the describe the problem, while the last three
methodology, since worth is a relative mea- define the key quantities in the analytical
sure that involves value judgements [Dersin formulation of the problem.
and Levis, 1981].
The system consists of components, their
interconnection and a set of operating pro-
cedures. A naval communications system, a attributes are expressed as functions of the
computer network or a testbed are typical primitives. The values of the attributes
systems. The system can be centralized could be obtained from the evaluation of a
(e.g., a testbed facility) or decentralized function, from a model, a computer simulation,
(e.g., a computer network). or from empirical data. Each attribute de-
pends, in general, on a subset of the primi-
The mission consists of a set of objectives tives, i.e.,
and tasks that the military organization is
assigned to accomplish. The description of A = f (xi, .. xk) (1)
the mission must be as explicit and specific s s
as possible so that it can be modeled analyt-
ically. For example, a mission specification each other. They are dependent, if they
such as "to defend the West Coast of the US"
is too broad, while a more useful specifica- have primitives in common. A system realiza-
tion would be "to detect enemy submarinestion would be "to detect enemy submriarines tion results in the set of primitives taking
off the cost of California". specific values {x.}. Substitution of these
values in the relationships (1) yields values
The context denotes the set of conditions and for the attribute set {As}. Thus, any spe-
assumptions, i.e., the environment, within cific realization can be depicted by a point
which the mission takes place and the system in the attribute space.
operates. For example, the context may in-
operates. For example, the gcontext may inaa The third and fourth steps consist of carry-
clude specification of the geographical area, ing out a similar analysis for the mission:
the time of the year, and the prevailing set Selection of the primitives that describe
Selection of the primitives that describe
the variables and parameters of the mission
Primitives are the variables and parameters and definition of the mission requirements.
that describe the system and the mission. For Then models are selected that map the primi-
example, in the case of a communications net- tives yj into the attributes:
work, primitives may include the number of
links and nodes, the capacity of each link, Am m (Y 2)
and the probability of failure of each link.
Primitives of a mission may be the designation Some of the mission attributes may be inter-
of origin-destination pairs, the data flow related through dependence on common primi-
rate between these points, and the duration tives, It is also possible to introduce
of each transmission. Let the system primi- directly some constraints between the attri-
tives be denoted by the set {x } and the mis- butes, e.g., a trade-off relationship between
sion primitives by the set {yj. delay and accuracy. However, it is prefer-
able that such trade-off relationships be
Attributes are quantities that describe system derived through the functions or models that
properties or mission requirements. System define attributes or requirements in terms
attributes for a communications system may of the mission primitives. Specification
include reliability, average delay, and sur- of values for the mission primitives results
vivability. Mission attributes are expressed in a point or region in the mission attri-
as requirements for the same quantities as bute space.
the system attributes, e.g., minimum reli-
ability, maximum average delay, or minimum The two spaces, the system attribute space
survivability. The system attributes are A and the mission attribute space A , al-
denoted by the set {A } and the mission at- tdough of the same dimension, may be defined
tributes by fA }. in terms of different attributes, or attri-
butes scaled differently. Therefore, the
Measures of Effectiveness are quantities that fifth step consists of transforming the
result from the comparison of the system and system and mission attributes into a set of
mission attributes. They reflect the extent common, commensurate attributes that define
to which the system is well matched to the a common attribute space A. For example,
mission. one of the system attributes may be vulner-
ability, while the corresponding mission
These six concepts are the key components of attribute may be survivability. Since they
the methodology for analyzing and assessing both reflect the same concept -- the effect
the effectiveness of C3 systems. of hostile actions -- one of them may be
chosen as the common attribute, say, surviv-
The first step of the methodology consists ability, while the other one will then be
of the selection of the set of system primi- mapped into the first one. Once the com-
tives. By definition, the elements of the mon set of attributes has been defined, the
set are mutually independent. In this sense, two sets {A s and {A I are transformed into
the primitives are the independent variables commensurate sets that can be depicted in
in the analytical formulation of the method- the common attribute space A.
ology.
A possible additional operation in this step
The second step consists of defining attributes is the normalization of the various commen-
for the system that characterize the properties surate attributes so that their values are
that are of interest in the analysis. The in the range 10,1]. If all the attributes
are normalized in this manner, then the
common attribute space is the unit hypercube. requirements of the mission. This is consis-
This is very useful in depicting graphically tent with the interpretation given in case
the loci of the sets {A } and {A } and in (b). The second interpretation is that the
analyzing their interrelationships. use of this system for the given mission
represents an inefficient use of resources
The sixth step is the key one in analyzing the since the system capabilities exceed the
effectiveness of a C3 system in view of the mission requirements. Inefficiency, in turn,
mission that is to be carried out. It consists implies lower effectiveness.
of procedures for comparing the system and
mission attributes through the geometric prop- If the system locus is included in the mis-
erties of two loci in the attribute space. sion locus, then the system's effectiveness
Consider first all the allowable values that is identically equal to unity.
the primitives of a specific realization of
the system may take. If the primitives are The measure of effectiveness given by (6) is
allowed to vary over their admissible ranges, one of many partial measures that can be
then the variations define a locus L in the defined in the common attribute space. Let
attribute space. Similarly, a mission locus these partial measures be denoted by {E .
L can be constructed. Both loci are defined To combine these partial measures into a
.m
in the unit hypercube. The geometric relation- single global measure, utility theory may be
ship between the two loci can take one of used [Debreu, 1958; Phlips, 1974]. The k
three forms: partial measures E1,...,Ek are now considered
to be the arguments of a utility function u.
(a) The two loci do not have any points However, for the valid application of utility
in common, i.e., the intersection theory, the-arguments of u must belong to
of L with L is null: the positive orthant of Rk, i.e., they should
take values in [0,+) ). For this to happen,
L n L = M (3) each E that takes values in [0,1) is mapped
s m r
to an E that takes values in [0,+ a). Many
functions exist for transforming the boundedIn this case, the system attributes do not
variables E to the unbounded ones; typical
satisfy the mission's requirements and one r
examples are
would define the effectiveness to be zero,
regardless of which specific measure is used. - log (1-E) E/1-E ; tanh 1E
(b) The two loci have points in common,E /
but neither locus is included in
the other:
Each of these mappings tends to emphasize
L nL m ~ (4) different segments of the range [0,1) and
s m
therefore weight in a different way the
and partial effectiveness measures E . There-
L U > L (5) fore, the subjective judgements of the
s m s system designers and the users can be in-
corporated directly into the methodology in
In this case, a subset of the values that the three ways: (a) by choosing different par-
system attributes may take satisfies the mis- tial measures, (b) by choosing the mapping
sion requirements. Many different measures function, and (c) by selecting a utility
can be used to describe the extent to which function. The global effectiveness measure
the system meets the requirements. Each of is obtained, finally, from
these measures may be considered as a measure
of effectiveness which, if normalized, takes E = u (El,02,.. .Ek) (8)
values in the open interval (0,1). For example,
let V be a measure in the normalized attribute The seven steps of the methodology and their
space. Then an effectiveness measure can be interrelationships are shown schematically
defined by in Figure 1. The diagram emphasizes that
the system and the mission must be modeled
E = V(L n L )/V(L ) (6) and analyzed independently, but in a common
context. The system capabilities should be
which emphasizes how well matched the system determined independently of the mission and
is to the mission. the mission requirements should be derived
without considering the system to be assessed.
(c) The mission locus is included in Otherwise, the assessment is biased.
the system locus:
The methodology will be illustrated in the
L n L = L (7) next section through application to a com-
munications network operating in a hostile
In this case, it follows from (7) that L is environment.
larger then L and, consequently, the ratio
defined by (6T will be less than unity. This
result can be interpreted in two ways. First,
only certain system attributes values meet the
The context for this network determines the
environment in which the system will operate:
I G-BAL Igeographical location, climatic conditions,
enemy capabilities and resources. The con-
?PATIN I text determines many of the primitives of
EFEIEESS L~EASE both the system and the mission.
I SYS~ I[ MISSIOS I The mission is defined in terms of the objec-
tives and tasks assigned to each node by the
[I >sUI;RAT I CoeNSUE I tactical plan. Let the aspect of the mission
SYSvM4 A~RBUTTESI MISSION ARIBUTES that is relevant to the pair (1,7), denoted
by (A,B) from now on, be the collection of
ITSYSIES I II SSION target information at node A and its trans-
mission to node B where the weapon system
is located,
--IM~ - IPRIMITIVES
Attributes
SYSTEM CONTEXT MISSION In one of the definitions of C3 systems
[AFM 1-1,1979] it is stated that "Command
and control systems must provide the com-
mander with communications networks that are
reliable rapid, survivable and secure." The
first three requirements motivated the defi-
Figure 1. The Methodology for C3 System nition of the attributes for this example:
Effectiveness Analys is reliability, time delay, and survivability.
A fourth one that characterizes the amount
of information that can be transmitted be-
tween A and B is the input fZow.
The attribute Reliability denotes the cap-
ASSESSMENT OF A C NETWORK ability of the system to deliver a message
from A to B when only the intrinsic, physical
Consider the communications network presented characteristics of the components (links)
in Figure 2. It consists of seven nodes and are taken into account. The relevant system
thirteen links. The nodes represent infor- primitive is the probability of failure, l-p,
mation collection and transmission centers or of each link, where it is assumed that link
decision centers or both. The network is failures are independent events. Survivability
assumed to be part of a C3 system operating in is defined as the ability of the network to
a hostile environment. Specifically, it is continue functioning in the presence of jam-
assumed that the links are subject to jam- ming. The system survivability depends on
ming that disrupts communication between nodes. the probability that the enemy attempts to
There are twenty-one possible origin-desti- jam a link (or links) and the probability
nation pairs in this network; only the pair that the link is jammed when attacked. Both
(1,7) will be used because the subsystem it reliability and survivability are special
defines is equal to the whole network. Multi- cases of availability. The distinction be-
ple pairs can be analyzed if each pair is tween reliability and survivability is that
considered as a subsystem. the former reflects the failure characteris-
tic of components and the effect of the
environment, while the latter models the
effect on the network of the enemy's elec-
tronic warfare capability.
10node A The attribute Time DeZay introduces the no-
2 / // tion of timeliness of the transmitted infor-
mation and the rapidity with which it is
transmitted, This attribute is critical
because in many instances target acquisition
6 by a weapon system depends on the speed with
which tracking information is received from
distant sensors. For this network, time
delay between nodes A and B is defined as
7- node B the sum of the delays in each link of a path
from A to B. The time delay is related to
the capacity of each link. Therefore, link
capacity is a system primitive.
Figure 2. A Simple Communications
Network. Input Flow is defined as the amount of data
transmitted from A to B, The underlying
assumption is that as more tracking data are
collected and transmitted to the weapon
system, the target acquisition is improved.
The input flow that can be transmitted depends
on the link capacities and the network topology; h = - p 2p 
it depends also on the time delay, i.e., there m
is an interrelationship between delay and flow.
The failure probabilities of the links are
Let the mission be the protection of platforms . e 
likely to vary with time. Since the p takeslocated at the network nodes by weapon systems l t [ i
values in the interval [0,1], it followslocated at node B, where the sensors are lo- that R a continuous function defined on a
cated in a platform denoted by node A, There- c , t n
closed set, takes minimum and maximumfore, the objective of the platform at A is
values. Furthermore, if p takes values in
to detect and identify enemy targets and com- the subinterval a, then R takes its
municate that information to the weapon . s im
minimum value R for p=a and its maximum
systems. The objective of node B is to destroy min
at least m percent of the enemy targets while R for p=b. Therefore, the reliability
suffering no more than n percent losses. .maxindex R in eq. (11) is an increasing func-Therefore, mission primitives are the level tion of its argument p. If the bounds a and
of forces of the two opponents, the single shot b are known, then the system reliability is
kill probabilitites, the time interval between bounded by
salvos, the radius of uncertainty in locating
a target, and the relative velocity between the R < R< R
targets and the weapon systems. With these min - - max
primitives, it is necessary to determine
conditions on the attributes that will imply While survivability depends on totally dif-
the success of the assigned mission. Now that ferent primitives, the analysis is identical
the overall situation has been described, the with that for reliability, but with the prob-
seven steps of the methodology can be applied. ability p replaced by
Step 1 and 2: System Attributes 1 - eiqi
Structural analysis models based on engineering where e. is the probability that the enemy
reliability theory [Barlow and Proschan, 1975] attacks link i and q. is the probability
and network theory [Ford and Fulkerson, 1962] that link i is jammed when attacked. If
can be used to model the reliability attribute the probability of survival of a link takes
and compute its value. values in the interval [a',b'], it follows
that the survivability index is bounded as
Let x. be a binary variable indicating whether follows:
link 1 is functioning (x.=l) or has failed
(x.=0). Similarly, the binary variable 4 S . < < S S (13)
specifies the state of the communication be-
tween nodes A and B. If the state of the com- Queueing theory is used to model the time
munication is determined completely by the delay in the communications network. Spe-
state of the links, then cifically, the M/M/1 model [Schwartz, 1977]
was used to determine the delay in trans-
-= .x 1 ,x2 ...,x13 (9) mitting packets from A to B. Let the capac-
ity of each link in the network of Figure 2
The function 4 is called the structure function ity of each link in th k of Figure
of the communication pair A,B. If p. denotes be denoted by C, with k = 1,2,..,13.There
otfu Pi ine., are thirty different paths that can be chosen
the probability the link i is functioning, ie.,' to transmit a packet from A to B and, there-
fore, thirty time delays, one for each path,
i = prob (xi can be computed. If path T. is chosen, then
the total delay along this bath is
then the reliability index R is defined as the [Bouthonnier, 1982]
expected value of the structure function:
R = E [(xX 2 ... .x13) (10) j Ck k-F (14)
For simplicity, let all the link failure prob- h 1
abilities be equal. Then the reliability packet and F is the input flow from A to B.
index for the pair A,B in the network defined Clearly, there will be a minimum and maximum
in Figure 2 is given as follows: delay over the thirty paths. So, depending
on the routing algorithm chosen, the delay T
m4 m2(P))(hm(P) h1 3))] may be bounded as follows:
(11) T . < T < T (15)
mwheren - - max
where
h h =1'- (1-p)2 Now let all the link capacities be equal
m 1 m2 to C and let C vary between Cmin and Cmax'
Then, for the network of Figure 2, the total
h = 2p2 + 2p3 - 5p4 + 2p5 delay from A to B satisfies [Bouthonnier,
m3 1982]:
tion rates a and b, respectively.
2 < T < 6 Solution of the differential equations (23),
11 C -F - C . -F (24) leads to the "square-law" attrition
max min
process:
The last condition relates two of the attri- 2 2 2 2
butes, Time DeZay and Input FZow. In order
to normalize these attributes so that they
Substitution of conditions (21) and (22) in
vary between 0 and 1, the following scaling (25) yields a condition on the attrition(25) yields a condition on the attritionfactors are introduced: rates
rates:
T = maximum duration of mission 2 2
b > l-m y (0) (26)
* -- ~a 2 2
F = p C (17) 1-n x (0)
Then the normalized attributes are The attrition rate b was defined in (24) as
,/T (18) Px/t . Let r be the kill radius of blue's
t = T/T (18) weapon system and let p denote the radius of
uncertainty in locating red targets. Then
and Px = r.2 / r2 (27)
K = F/F (19)
The value of p depends not only on the sur-
and relation (16) takes the form veillance systems, but also on the ability of
the network to transmit surveillance data about
2/T F 6/T F a moving target accurately and quickly to node
1-k - - c . -2 B. The radius of uncertainty is assumed to be
min K (20) given by the following function of S,R,F, and T:
C
max 2
p = S- _10c(l-.9F) + vT] (28)
Thus, inequalities (13), (14), and (20) define S+R
the system locus Ls in the four-dimensional where c is the radius of uncertainty due to
unit hypercube. the surveillance system alone and v is the
relative speed to the red target.
Steps 3 and 4: Mission Attributes Introduction of the normalized variables K
and t, substitution of (27) and (28) in (26),
Let x(t) denote the number of blue forces and
y(t) d the number of red forces The dresirable and some algebraic manipulations yield they(t) the number of red forces. The desirable
conditions for blue ar that at the end of following requirement for the mission attri-
conditions for blue ar~ that at the end of butes:
the mission (at time T ),
x(T )/x(0) > n (21) S + R + cK - c2t > c (29)
y(T )/y(0) < m (22) where c,c 2, and c are coefficients dependenton a,m,n,c,T*,F*,xb0) and y(0).
where n and m are positive numbers in the is defined then as the
The mission locus, L , is d efined then as theinterval [0,1). A model is needed that de- portion of the fourimensinal unit hyper-
scribes the engagement. For this example, the cube bounded by the hyperplane (29).
Lanchester combat model that describes the
"salvo fire" engagement was chosen for its
simplicity rather than its realistic depiction Step 5: The System and Mission Loc
of naval engagements. War games or extensive
ofmnaaiengagemldbents.dWar gamesyor exthenmis In the previous four steps, the inequalities
simulations could be used to analyze the mis-
sion in some detail and obtain realistic defining the two loci were derived. Numerical
values must be selected now so that the loci
can be specified completely and the assess-
ment of effectiveness carried out.
In the "salvo fire" engagement model each blue
(red) unit fires every t (resp. t ) time units
at radm tre ble uis.L p e Let the probability of a link failing, l-p,
at random at red (blue) units. Le (y) be range from 0.607 to 0.630 and let the prob-
the single shot probability of kill of a red ability that a link will be jammed vary over
(blue) unit by a blue (red) unit. If the the same range. Then, inequalities (12) and
single shot probabilities are small [Mangulis, (13) become:
1980] then the Lanchester model reduces to
0.4 < R < 0.45 (30)
x 
=
- (p/ty) y = - ay (23)
0.4 < S < 0,45 (31)
y = - (p /t ) x = - bx (24) while (20) becomes
where the ratios of the kill probability to 0.1 < t < 0.3 (32)
the interval between salvos denote the attri- 1-k - - 0.7-k
for T* F* =5 and Cm ./C =0.7. Analysis where the coefficients clc , and c3 have
been set equal to unity. Tie interrelation-
of (32) shows that ship between the system and the mission loci
is shown in Figures 6, 7, and 8. Clearly,
0.1 < t < 1 the two loci represent solids in four-dimen-
sional space and, furthermore, the two
and solids intersect.
0 < K < 0.9,
i.e., the normalized delay is at least 0.1
and the input flow cannot exceed 0.9. The
locus L is depicted graphically in terms of
three three-dimensional projections, Figs.
3, 4, and 5. In the third figure the un-
specified axis is-either S or R. O R
The mission locus, Lm , is defined by the
inequality /
S+R+K-t > 1
Kj i Fig. ·6. Intersection of L and L in
(S,R,t) Space
R
R
S 
Fig. 3. Projection of L in (S,R,K) Space
Fig. 7. Tntersection of L and L in
(S,R,K) Space b
t
K
big. 4. Projection of Ls in (S,R,t) Space 
ti
Fig. 8. Intersection of L and L in
/1 I X(S,K,t) or (R,K,tf Space m
Step 6: Effectiveness Measures
Many different measures may be used to eval-
i 2 e Ad t uate and compare the system and the mission
locus. Let the first one considered be
the volume:
(X V1 = |JJJ dS dR dK dt
Then, the volume of the system locus can be
comnputed analytically
Fin. 5 Projection of L in (S,K,t) or
(R,K,t) Space s
plied to the second network and a measure
V (Ls) = 0.131 x 10 of effectiveness obtained. Comparison be-
tween the two networks using the effective-
ness measures (as well as the attributes)
The volume of the intersection of the system ness measures (as well as the attributes)
would be straightforward because both the
and mission loci can also be computed analyt-
ically mission locican also be computed anayt attributes and the measures of effectiveness
are commensurate.
V1 (L nVt) = 0.201 x 10-3 CONCLUSIONS
A class of measures based on volumetric A new approach for assessing the effective-
comparisons is one defined by ness of C3 systems has been presented. The
key idea is to relate, in a quantitative
V2 =7JjJJ w(S,R,K,t) dS dR dK dt way, the capabilities of a C system to the
requirements of the mission(s) that the
Let military unit or organization has been as-
signed to execute. Each step of the metho-
w(S,R,K,t) = (S+R) K dology (specification of system and mission
primitives, definition of attributes, model-
Then the system locus measure can be computed ing the system and the mission, constructing
analytically the two loci) brings into sharper focus
qualitative information on what the system
V (L ) = 0.516 x o10 is intended to do, where it is intended to
be used, and how it is intended to be used.
while the measure of the intersection is Posing and addressing these questions is
computed numerically essential for assessing C" systems which
are complex, often large scale, service
V2 (L L ) = 0.106 x 10o delivery systems.2(s m
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